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 Evaluating Conflict Mineral Legislation in 
the Democratic Republic of  Congo
Cortney Linnecke
introduction
Conflict minerals are everywhere. Gold, tin, tantalum, and tungsten can be found in elec-tronics, automobiles, and even jewelry, thus 
developing an immediate but invisible presence in 
the lives of consumers. They illustrate a direct rela-
tionship between Western consumers and mines in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and thus 
a connection between Westerners and miners in the 
DRC who may operate under conditions of abuse, 
corruption, and conflict. This presence is described as 
“invisible” because despite the irrefutable presence of 
conflict minerals in everyday goods, many consumers 
remain ignorant of their own connections to a crisis 
occurring halfway around the world.
In recent years, however, the visibility of conflict in 
the Congo increased, and along with it conflict min-
erals began garnering attention. Global leaders started 
to take notice of the humanitarian abuses occurring 
in the DRC: mass murder, rape, torture, and ethnic 
violence. They began drawing connections between 
the armed groups that committed these abuses, the 
mines they were fighting to control, and, by exten-
sion, connections with multinational companies that 
were supporting mines and armed groups through 
the trade of conflict minerals.
Knowledge of the conflict mineral trade elicited 
different responses from different nations. Some 
countries, particularly Eastern and Asian countries, 
decided to separate business interests from humani-
tarian concerns, and continued investing and trad-
ing in the DRC. Other countries, the United States 
in particular, decided to pass legislation that would 
prevent multinational corporations from purchasing 
minerals that had been sourced under conditions of 
conflict in the DRC.
Specifically, the United States passed the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act (Dodd-Frank Act). Section 1502 of this Act, a 
small section accounting for only about five pages 
out of a document 848 pages long, seeks to regulate 
the relationship between international companies 
and conflict minerals. It necessitates due diligence, 
meaning that companies by law must account for the 
legitimacy and conflict-free nature of any minerals 
they purchase and use to produce goods. Though the 
methods to confirm mineral legitimacy may vary, the 
Dodd-Frank Act is firm in the stance that companies 
must take measures to source their minerals. They do 
this by undergoing a series of audits and submitting 
a series of reports to legitimize their sourcing meas-
ures. Similar due diligence laws have been passed by 
other countries, and the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development has developed an in-
ternational framework for the regulation and trade of 
conflict minerals.
These types of international response were born out 
of a belief that stopping the purchase of conflict min-
erals would stop the flow of profits to armed groups 
in the DRC; that eliminating their income would 
disband the groups, and that disbanding the armed 
groups would stop the conflict. While anti-conflict 
mineral legislation did, in fact, reduce revenues to 
armed groups in the DRC, it did not disband mili-
taries or terminate the country’s conflict. Instead, in-
ternational companies—turned off by the new costs 
that accompanied due diligence—began halting in-
vestment and trade in the Congo. As a result, the 
DRC started experiencing newfound plights: local 
economies collapsed, healthcare declined, children 
began dropping out of school, and unemployment 
swelled.
The international response, therefore, produced a 
paradox. Global leaders had passed laws in an effort 
to help raise the Congo from its crisis, but in some 
ways these laws had only aggravated the problem. 
How could well-intentioned legislation go so horri-
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bly awry in execution? Why did no one foresee the 
negative fall-out of anti-conflict mineral legislation? 
And perhaps most importantly, what can the global 
community learn from the failure of anti-conflict 
mineral legislation and specifically from the failure of 
the Dodd-Frank Act?
This paper will seek to explore the weaknesses and 
failings of such legislation in order to propose im-
provements for the ways in which the global commu-
nity interacts with and intervenes in the Congo. In 
order to do this, however, this paper must start at the 
beginning. The story of anti-conflict mineral legisla-
tion does not start in 2010 with the Dodd-Frank Act. 
Rather, this paper must take into account the history 
of the Congo, the actualities of mining, production 
and trade in the DRC, and the specifics of the legisla-
tion itself. All of these are necessary components in 
attaining a thorough understanding of how and why 
anti-conflict mineral legislation failed in the ways 
that it did. This, in turn, is important because it is 
only through understanding the failures of anti-con-
flict mineral legislation that the global community 
can begin to craft realistic solutions for peace.
Background
The DRC’s relations with Europe began in 1482, 
when Diogo Cao—a Portuguese explorer—first vis-
ited the country (Democratic Republic of Congo 
Profile, 2015). Cao established ties with the monar-
chy of the Kongo empire, which had come to power 
roughly two centuries earlier in the 1200s (Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo Profile, 2015).
However, it wasn’t until the 16th and 17th centuries 
that European interest in the Congo really gained 
momentum. During this time, slave traders from 
Portugal, France, Great Britain, and the Netherlands 
exported roughly one million Africans from the 
Loango Coast (Democratic Republic of Congo Pro-
file, 2015). Other statistics are less modest in their 
estimation of slaves sold in this timeframe, plac-
ing the numbers closer to 3 million and 13 million 
(Haskin, 2005). No matter the exact number of lives 
trafficked, the slave trade, which flourished until the 
1830s, had lasting impacts on the Congolese way of 
life. It disrupted existing social hierarchies, encour-
aged a view of humanity that devalued individuals 
as expendable commodities, and imported foreign 
goods and ideas such as alcohol, guns, and the seeds 
of capitalism (Gondola, 2005).
Perhaps more than anything, however, the slave trade 
opened the door for European imperialism and the 
subsequent colonization of the Congo. With the ad-
vent of the Industrial Revolution in Europe, demand 
for the natural resources of Africa—such as rubber, 
ivory, palm oil, lumber, and peanuts—dramatically 
increased. Since the far-reaching effects of the slave 
trade had weakened Africa, the people of the Congo 
were therefore rendered essentially incapable of with-
standing Europe’s invasion (Gondola, 2005).
In 1885, King Leopold II of Belgium established the 
Congo Free State, which would become an official 
colony of Belgium in 1908 (Democratic Republic of 
Congo Profile, 2015). The realities of Leopold’s rule 
were harsh and barbaric. He plundered the Congo’s 
natural resources and committed many serious hu-
man rights violations through his extractive efforts 
(Arieff, 2014). These abuses included taking women 
and children hostage to ensure men’s cooperation in 
forced labor, as well as imposing brutal punishments 
on any Congolese who failed to meet extraction 
quotas or pay the taxes that were levied to ludicrous 
rates under his rule (Haskin, 2005). Punishments 
were inflicted in varying shades of brutality along a 
spectrum of violence: chopping off hands and ears, 
floggings with a chicotte (a sharp, spiked hide), be-
ing shot, being hanged, and being beheaded (Haskin, 
2005). The exact number of casualties incurred un-
der Leopold’s reign remains uncertain, but estimates 
range anywhere from 5 million to 22 million deaths 
(Haskin, 2005). With such methods, Leopold set 
an example of authority that derived its power from 
brute force and violence, initiating an unfortunate 
pattern of turbulence to come among Congolese 
leaders.
But Leopold’s damage was not limited solely to the 
destruction of lives. He also reinforced ethnic divides 
by mandating that the Congolese list a tribal identity 
when completing governmental forms, which “tend-
ed unconsciously to breed ethnic awareness” (Young, 
1965, p. 266). Such awareness would resurface as 
ethnic tension and conflict years later. Along with the 
Catholic Church, Leopold also laid a foundation of 
instability in the Congo by repressing the education 
of its citizens. Education in the Congo Free State ex-
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tended only to secondary school, although most stu-
dents did not make it to even that level. This limit 
on education was imposed in an effort to prevent 
uprisings and organized resistance to Belgian rule; 
the Catholic slogan of the time even quipped, “No 
elite, no problem” (Haskin, 2005, p. 3). While this 
initiative would not ultimately prevent revolution in 
the Congo Free State, it would sow ignorance and 
inexperience among the Congolese in terms of self-
rule. Thus, even when the Congolese finally achieved 
independence, they struggled to re-order the coun-
try and achieve effective self-administration (Haskin, 
2005).
In 1965, a military colonel named Mobutu Sese 
Seko seized power (Democratic Republic of Congo 
Profile, 2015). He would rule for three decades un-
der what has now been described as a “kleptocrat-
ic…reign of terror” (Haskin, 2005, p. 6). Mobutu 
stripped citizens of their fundamental rights, com-
mitted atrocities as a means of generating fear, relied 
on fraudulent elections and corrupt political tactics, 
and allowed civil conflicts from neighboring coun-
tries to spill over the DRC’s borders (Haskin, 2005). 
In particular, Mobutu welcomed Hutu extremists—
the perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide of the ear-
ly 1990s—into Zaire’s refugee camps, which upset 
among Zairian Tutsis, Rwanda’s newly established 
Tutsi government, and Burundi (Arieff, 2014). The 
tumultuous presence of foreign refugees and military 
groups is a problem that the DRC still struggles with 
today.
In 1997, rebel forces assisted by Rwanda, Uganda, 
and Angola overthrew Mobutu and the more liberal 
Laurent Kabila came to power (Democratic Republic 
of Congo Profile, 2015). Under Kabila the DRC saw 
political upheaval, Africa’s first World War, and ul-
timately the assassination of Kabila himself (Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo Profile, 2015). Under Lau-
rent Kabila’s rule, an additional 3 million Congolese 
succumbed to disease, violence, starvation, and other 
sufferings (Haskin, 2005).
Laurent Kabila was succeeded by his son, Joseph 
Kabila (Arieff, 2014). Under his reign, the DRC ex-
perienced a transitional government period in 2003, 
received a new constitution in 2005, and underwent 
their first “relatively free and fair” (Arieff, 2014, p. 
120) multiparty elections in 2006. Despite these suc-
cesses, the DRC today remains a hotbed of conflict, 
violence, and economic suffering. Additionally, the 
country continues to maintain complex, strained, 
and even volatile relations with its neighboring na-
tions of Uganda, Rwanda, and Angola (Arieff, 2014).
It is within these modern and delicate circumstances, 
and emerged from this history of turbulence, bru-
tality, and strife, that the conversation surrounding 
the conflict mineral trade is rooted in and built upon 
today.
Mining, Production and 
trade in the drc
The Context
Mining is the cornerstone of the DRC’s economy. 
Besides mining’s social and political implications, 
it also impacts the nation’s gross domestic product, 
foreign exchange generation, budgetary revenues, 
and employment statistics (Engineering and Min-
ing Journal, 2000). The Natural Resource Govern-
ance Institute (n.d.) estimated that in 2010 the ex-
tractive sector accounted for twenty percent of the 
DRC’s gross domestic product. Despite mining’s 
crucial role in the economic life of the DRC, it has 
been implicated in conflict and has not contributed 
to sustainable and equitable economic development. 
The mining sector has suffered from corruption, in-
stability, and a lack of transparency. Regardless, min-
ing has remained a major source of employment and 
state revenue for the DRC (De Koning, 2011). The 
DRC—one of the world’s poorest countries—ironi-
cally holds some of the world’s greatest potential for 
wealth, with an estimated 24 trillion dollars’ worth 
of available minerals buried in Congo’s eastern hills 
(Wolfe, 2015).
The Minerals
The most significant minerals implicated in the 
DRC’s conflict trade are gold, cassiterite, coltan, 
and wolframite, although they are more commonly 
known by the names of their extracted ores: gold, 
tin, tantalum, and tungsten (De Koning, 2011). 
These substances are in high demand, since they are 
the fundamental metals used often in modern-day 
technology like cameras, cellular phones, computers, 
and iPods. As expert John Prendergast explained, if 
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a good has a circuit board, then it probably utilizes 
minerals from the DRC (Raj, 2011). Additionally, 
gold is commonly sought after by traders in Middle 
and Eastern Asia, where it is used to craft jewelry. 
(De Koning, 2011).
Gold. In 2012, the DRC was estimated to have the 
10th highest reserves of gold in the world; howev-
er, current reserve figures are not available (KPMG 
Global Mining Institute [KPMG], 2014, p. 20). The 
2014 Democratic Republic of Congo: Country Mining 
Guide from the KPMG Global Mining Institute of-
fers a bit more insight to gold production, and their 
most recent estimated statistics show a production of 
3,500 kg of gold in 2011—a significant drop from 
peak production of 12,400 kg in 2002 and 10,300 
kg in 2006 (p. 28).
These numbers must be taken with a grain of salt, 
however, considering the growing popularity of gold 
in the Congolese black market in recent years. A 2014 
report from the United Nations found that as much 
as 98% of all gold produced in the DRC is smuggled 
out of the nation, meaning that there is significant 
mining, production, and trade unaccounted for in 
official reports (Arieff, 2014). While other mineral 
outputs tend to be more easily accounted for, all of-
ficial data regarding mineral production should still 
be viewed with the understanding that reports often 
do not represent complete statistics.
Tin. The DRC accounts for 3% of global tin produc-
tion (KPMG, 2014, p. 20). While there are no cur-
rent statistics on the nation’s tin reserves, the DRC 
produced 3,000 t of tin in 2014 (U.S. Geological 
Survey [USGS], 2015). This places the DRC as the 
world’s seventh greatest tin producer (KPMG, 2014, 
p. 2).
Tantalum. Reserve statistics on tantalum are also un-
available for the DRC; however, production statistics 
are available for the capital city of Kinshasa. In 2014, 
Kinshasa produced 180 t of tantalum, accounting for 
28% of global tantalum production (USGS, 2015). 
These numbers qualify the DRC as the third largest 
producer of tantalum in the world (KPMG, 2014, 
p. 2).
Tungsten. No numbers are available regarding tung-
sten reserves in the DRC. However, the nation pro-
duced 800 t of tungsten in 2014 (USGS, 2015).
Other minerals. Gold, tin, tantalum, and tungsten 
are traditionally seen as the primary minerals impli-
cated in conflict in the DRC but their mining and 
production in the DRC are actually marginal in 
comparison to the nation’s most important minerals, 
which may also be associated with conflict: cobalt, 
copper, and diamonds (KPMG, 2014). The DRC ac-
counts for 51% of the global cobalt production and 
is home to 41% of the world’s cobalt reserves, with 
an estimated 3.4 million tonnes of cobalt in reserves 
at Kinshasa in 2014 (KPMG, 2014, p. 20).
Copper is another mineral that is of increasing im-
portance in the Congolese mining sector. In 2014, it 
was estimated that the Kinshasa region had reserves 
of 20 million tonnes of copper (USGS, 2015). De-
spite enormous resources—the DRC has the world’s 
largest undeveloped high-grade copper deposit—the 
DRC currently only accounts for 3% of global copper 
production, ranking it as the eighth highest copper 
producer in the world (KPMG, 2014, p. 2). How-
ever, the copper sector is expected to develop and 
largely drive growth in the next five years. Reserves 
at mines such as Kipoi and Kamoto are “estimated 
to contain [copper ore] grades above 3%, significant-
ly higher than the world average of 0.6% - 0.8%” 
(KPMG, 2014, p. 2). This will be an important is-
sue as some of the world’s largest mines, including 
Antamina in Peru, Escondida in Chile, and Grasberg 
in Indonesia, have experienced falling ore grades and 
thus higher extraction costs (Business Monitor Inter-
national [BMI], 2014).
The DRC also produces 25% of the world’s dia-
monds (KPMG, 2014, p. 20), with industrial re-
serves at Kinshasa expected to hold 150 million car-
ats (USGS, 2015). All of these minerals—gold, tin, 
tantalum, tungsten, cobalt, copper, and diamonds—
have been implicated in the conflict mineral trade at 
some point or another, and they are probably not the 
only minerals that have been sourced under condi-
tions of violence and illegal activity. However, lit-
erature surrounding the conflict mineral trade tends 
to only formally recognize the first four of these as 
“conflict minerals.” Additionally, the Dodd-Frank 
Act (2010) defines conflict minerals as gold, tin, tan-
talum, and tungsten, which will be further discussed 
later on. It is important to recognize that while gold, 
tin, tantalum, and tungsten may be the most com-
monly implicated in conflict, they are not the only 
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minerals subject to the conflict trade. In fact, all of 
the DRC’s mineral resources have the potential to be 
involved in the conflict trade and therefore should be 
treated as such.
The Actors
Artisanal miners. It is difficult to determine how 
many artisanal miners are active in the DRC. Ar-
tisanal miners are independent, small-scale miners 
who usually spend long days under harsh conditions, 
digging through the mud with their hands and rudi-
mentary tools in search of minerals. Modest estimates 
figure that artisanal mining employs approximately 
450,000 people (De Koning, 2011); others suggest 
that at least 1 million people are active in artisanal 
mining (KPMG, 2014, p. 18). Others still point out 
that small-scale mining supports a wider commu-
nity than those actually involved in mining activi-
ties, with some claims stating that artisanal mining 
provides direct or indirect support to more than 10 
million people in the Congo (International Peace In-
formation Service, 2013).
Unlike industrial mining, which is overseen by busi-
nessmen in air-conditioned offices and benefits from 
the convenience of heavy equipment, artisanal min-
ers work on small-scale or independent levels, labor-
ing long days under the sun with only their bare 
hands and rudimentary tools for assistance. Artisanal 
miners—along with other actors in the mining sec-
tor, including workers at militarized and industrial-
ized mines—are subject to harsh working conditions. 
They are exposed to landslides, heavy metal inhala-
tion, water contamination, monsoons, mercury, and 
prevalent child labor (KPMG, 2014, p. 18). It has 
been reported that up to 40% of all workers in the 
mining sector are children (KPMG, 2014, p. 18). 
The 1967 Labor Code, in compliance with sugges-
tions made by the International Labor Organization, 
regulates labor guidelines concerning women, chil-
dren, working conditions, and anti-discrimination, 
but “with the collapse of the economy and corrup-
tion in government, the enforcement of the code has 
been negatively affected” (KPMG, 2014, p. 18).
Artisanal mining is largely informal despite the 2002 
Democratic Republic of Congo Mining Code stipu-
lating guidelines and conditions for small-scale min-
ing (International Peace Information Service, 2013). 
The Directorate of Mines, a body formed to regulate 
mining activities with an emphasis on health, safe-
ty, and social issues, also issued a series of require-
ments for legal small-scale mining. The lengthy list 
of requirements includes obtaining an exploration 
license, a small-scale exploitation license, and the ar-
tisanal miner’s card, among other provisions (BMI, 
2014). However, most of these guidelines are not ef-
fectively enforced and thus are ignored by artisanal 
miners, who usually are not properly registered and 
perform mining activities on illegal property (Inter-
national Peace Information Service, 2013).
Armed groups. There are numerous armed groups 
vying for power in the DRC. For most of these 
groups, money is power. Money provides the in-
come needed to finance armies, purchase weapons, 
and conduct business deals or bribes. And, consider-
ing the economic influence of mines in the DRC, 
control of mines and minerals means money. Thus, 
mines mean power.
In July 2003, a transitional Congolese government 
was born out of the 2002 Global and Inclusive Peace 
Agreement, which laid a formal foundation for peace 
and was hoped to be the beginning of the end of con-
flict in the DRC (De Koning, 2011). However, the 
new government failed to bring “all rebel and militia 
groups under effective central command” (De Kon-
ing, 2011, p. 15), and as a result, fighting continued. 
There were—and still are—several main armies in-
volved in perpetuating the fight. First is the Forces 
Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo, or 
the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (FARDC), which is the official national mili-
tary. Then there is the Forces démocratiques de libéra-
tion du Rwanda, the Democratic Forces for the Lib-
eration of Rwanda (FDLR). The FDLR formed out 
of exiled Rwandan rebel groups which spilled across 
Congolese borders, and includes the Interahamwe 
responsible for perpetuating the Rwandan genocide 
along with other ethnic Hutus generally opposed to 
Tutsi rule (De Koning, 2011). The presence of the 
genocidaires deeply upset Congolese Tutsis, and re-
mains a cause of resentment and tension to this day 
(Haskin, 2005).
The FDLR was also significant in that it shaped the 
mission of the Congrès national pour la défense du 
peuple, or the National Congress for the Defense of 
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the People (CNDP). The CNDP was a political army 
formed by Laurent Nkunda in 2006 with the mission 
to protect Congolese Tutsis from the FDLR (Arieff, 
2014). The CNDP has since been fractured and inte-
grated into the FARDC, at least in the physical sense. 
In reality, however, the integration was not welcomed 
by all the soldiers and many retained their original 
military loyalties, thus making the integration effort 
a superficial one at best (De Koning, 2011). As a re-
sult, the FARDC remains today an army with deep 
internal divisions and very weak centralization.
Finally, there is the military presence of the Mai-Mai, 
or community-based militias. The Mai-Mai militias 
rose chiefly out of the need for locals to defend their 
communities against the influx of other armies, both 
national and foreign.  While there have also been 
efforts to integrate the Mai-Mai into the FARDC, 
these efforts have been met with similarly limited 
success (De Koning, 2011).
All armed groups partake in the violent power strug-
gle surrounding Congolese mines. Despite efforts to 
neutralize, demobilize, and stabilize armies in the 
DRC, there has been an upsurge of military violence 
in mineral rich areas, with many rebel armies stag-
ing retaliatory attacks on mines they’ve lost control 
over (De Koning, 2011). And the FARDC, which is 
meant to provide stability and security to the Congo, 
is not exempt from this behavior: it has poor govern-
ance and abusive tendencies. Its failure to consoli-
date security across the country has helped breed an 
environment where “state actors often appear more 
focused on controlling resources and augmenting 
their personal power than on establishing security, 
creating effective state institutions, and fostering so-
cioeconomic development for the DRC’s 75 million 
inhabitants” (Arieff, 2014).
As a whole, the military presence in the Congolese 
mining sector is a dangerous one. Militaries prey on 
civilian populations and are often implicated in mass 
lootings, killings, rapes, and illicit business opera-
tions (Arieff, 2014). The corruption of militaries and 
the ways in which they perpetuate conflict through 
the mining and trade of minerals will be addressed in 
further detail later on.
Industrial presence. Even though artisanal and al-
luvial miners account for most of the operations in 
the Congolese mining sector, there are still a number 
of state-owned, domestic and foreign companies at 
play. The industrial presence in mining remains rela-
tively small, however, because of the high-risk busi-
ness environment in the DRC. In 2013, the World 
Bank’s Doing Business report ranked the DRC as 181 
out of 185 countries, placing it as one of the worst 
nations in the world with which to engage in busi-
ness (Arieff, 2014). Private sector development faces 
a large range of obstacles in the Congo, “including 
underdeveloped infrastructure, inadequate contract 
enforcement, limited access to credit, continued inse-
curity in the east, inadequate property rights protec-
tion, high levels of bureaucratic red tape and corrup-
tion, and a lack of reliable electricity” (Arieff, 2014, 
p. 128). The DRC poses so many concerns and risks 
when it comes to business operations that many mul-
tinational corporations are subsequently discouraged 
from investment, and, in recent years, due diligence 
laws have further decreased international incentive 
to get involved in the Congolese mining sector. This 
phenomenon will be further expanded upon in later 
sections of this paper.
Nevertheless, there is still a large-scale industrial pres-
ence in the DRC. The mining of gold is dominated 
principally by two corporations: Randgold Resources 
and AngloGold Ashanti, which own and operate the 
Kibali mine (BMI, 2014). While not as dominant 
as Randgold and Anglogold, the Banro Corporation 
also accounts for a portion of the gold sector, and 
the rest of the sector is mostly composed of artisanal 
miners (BMI, 2014). Copper mines in the DRC are 
also highly diversified, with major international and 
domestic players being Tenke Fungurume Mining, 
Katanga Mining, Freeport, Glencore Xstrata, Anvil 
Mining, and Chemaf (BMI, 2014). The diamond 
sector is similarly diversified, with one-third of its 
production overseen by the state and the other two-
thirds left to alluvial mining (BMI, 2014). The in-
dustrial presence is also felt in the silver and iron ore 
sectors of mining. As for other sectors, however, such 
as tin, it seems that large corporations are more hesi-
tant to get their hands dirty. As a result, most mining 
in the remaining sectors is either carried out in mili-
tarized mines or by artisanal miners (BMI, 2014).
While there seems to be hesitancy to engage in pri-
vate sector development in the DRC—not only be-
cause of business risks, but also out of fear of being 
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implicated in human rights abuses—there are still 
areas of the world willing to establish trade relations 
with the Congo. One such area is China, which has 
an investment track record that has been more for-
giving of human rights violations and unjust busi-
ness practices than other countries. This stance, 
combined with a mining landscape relatively free of 
international competition, has led to the supposition 
that China will become a major actor in the field of 
Congolese mineral extraction in coming years (BMI, 
2014). And in fact, increased Chinese investment in 
the DRC is already occurring. China has been drawn 
to the Congo for its large quantities of untapped re-
sources, low mining costs, and the fact that the West’s 
relative abandonment of Congo in the mineral trade 
has left doors wide open for Chinese businessmen 
(Lee, 2010).
The Process and Its Problems
It is important to know the actors involved in the 
DRC’s mining sector. However, it is also important 
to know the trade process and understand the steps 
involved in getting the minerals from the actors into 
the hands of global manufacturers. After extraction, 
minerals and ores usually first come into contact with 
petits négociants, or small-scale intermediaries.
These intermediaries have either pre-financed extrac-
tion operations—by trading equipment in exchange 
for minerals—or simply buy the minerals outright, in 
order to then sell them to trading chains (De Koning, 
2011). The traders who purchase the minerals from 
the small-scale intermediaries are known as négoci-
ants. They, in turn, sell the minerals to buying houses 
called comptoirs, which arrange exports to manufac-
turers (De Koning, 2011). Minerals are transported 
along trade routes either by road or by air (De Kon-
ing, 2011).
This process sounds very neat and orderly when laid 
out so simply on paper. However, in truth the official 
mineral trade is anything but organized and efficient. 
It is rampant with difficulties, corruption, and con-
flict, and is severely undermined by demand from 
black markets and home refineries. The most popular 
mineral in underground trade is gold, which has a 
high value by volume, meaning that valuable, export-
able quantities can be concealed easily (De Koning, 
2011). It is estimated that $1.24 billion worth of 
gold is smuggled out of the DRC each year (De Kon-
ing, 2011). It is hard to regulate such illegal exports 
of minerals, since many traders and buying houses 
own private airlines and road transport companies, 
which are often used to transport minerals and alleg-
edly facilitate smuggling (De Koning, 2011). Like-
wise, public efforts to improve Congolese infrastruc-
ture and develop road systems have ironically made 
it more and more difficult to trace and control illegal 
exports of conflict minerals.
Militaries also engage in and directly benefit from 
this illicit trade. Low pay combined with a corrupt 
and unfair military payroll generates incentive for 
militiamen to seek other means of income—namely, 
by smuggling and trading minerals illegally (De Kon-
ing, 2011). On a larger scale, mineral profits are used 
to fund entire armed groups. Unlawful profits from 
tin, tantalum, tungsten, and gold collectively funded 
armies an approximated $185 million in 2008, and 
gold alone is estimated to bring in an annual $44 
million to $88 million to militaries (Raj, 2011). 
These profits are used to buy more weapons in or-
der to impose a “brutal form of order” (Raj, 2011, p. 
989) upon a population already ravaged by disease, 
poverty, and civil war.
Aside from the black market, state and non-state 
actors alike are involved in underhanded business 
deals, such as underpricing assets and refusing to 
pay taxes, duties, and fines (Arieff, 2014). One such 
example can be found by observing the complex 
deals involving offshore companies and two multi-
national companies, Glencote and Eurasian Natural 
Resources Corporation. Investigations have shown 
that the companies have ties to President Kabila, al-
though specifics on the exact nature of these ties re-
main vague. Nevertheless, this relationship suggests a 
conflict of interest, perhaps even that the Congolese 
President is benefiting from the sale of conflict min-
erals and, as a result, may also have a decreased incen-
tive to end the conflict mineral trade (Arieff, 2014).
Actors in the conflict mineral trade also frequently 
partake in tax fraud. Mining authorities, such as 
commanding militaries, often levy unofficial taxes 
and traders in order to reap personal profit. These 
taxes can vary greatly, ranging from as little as the 
equivalent of $5 a week to the equivalent of $3,000 a 
week (De Koning, 2011). Such levies can be applied 
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at any point in the production and trade chain. This 
exploitation is also more regularly found in mines 
that experience frequent shifts in ownership (De 
Koning, 2011).
Many miners, militias, small-scale intermediaries, 
and traders also organize lootings of mining sites 
and villages. These raids not only provide immediate 
profit gain, but also breed insecurity to discourage 
the return of refugees, disrupt the FARDC deploy-
ments, and eliminate commercial competitors from 
the commodity chain (De Koning, 2011). Lootings 
occur most frequently in the Walikale territory and 
are most often perpetuated by the Mai-Mai Sheka 
(De Koning, 2011). While the FARDC does not 
participate in lootings as frequently—since they are 
supposed to protect the Congolese people, not attack 
them—they are not guilt-free. It is difficult to dis-
tinguish the number of lootings perpetuated by the 
FARDC, because when national soldiers attack vil-
lages they often disguise their identity to escape pun-
ishment by the national army (De Koning, 2011). 
Whoever the perpetrator, these raids leave the civilian 
population scattered, terrorized, and impoverished.
Desire for mine control and mineral profits has also 
been shown to fuel a culture of rape and sexual vio-
lence in the DRC. Sexual violence is “used as a sys-
tematic weapon of war in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo to subjugate and humiliate civilians in 
regions under militia control” (Raj, 2011, p. 990). 
Human Rights Watch has estimated that since 1998, 
tens of thousands of women—if not hundreds of 
thousands—have fallen victim to sadistic rapes (Raj, 
2011). Although no militia is truly exempt from the 
violence, many of the rapes have been inflicted by 
Rwandan genocidaires, the majority of whom are 
never brought to justice and instead continue to 
“roam with impunity and continue in positions of 
power through mineral profits” (Raj, 2011, p. 990). 
Thus, the Congo has been labeled “the most danger-
ous place on earth to be a woman” (Raj, 2011, p. 
989). Relatedly, the country also came in dead last on 
the 2013 U.N. Human Development Index (Arieff, 
2014).
While in no way does all this conflict stem from min-
ing, it is not a coincidence that violence is concen-
trated in North and South Kivu, as well as the Orien-
tale, the Congolese provinces containing the greatest 
mineral wealth (Raj, 2011). In 2011, it was estimat-
ed that 45,000 Congolese die every month as a result 
of ongoing conflict, which amounts to about 1,500 
preventable deaths a day (Raj, 2011). Additionally, 
there are over 2.6 million Congolese displaced inter-
nally, with an additional 500,000 Congolese refugees 
seeking shelter in border countries (Arieff, 2014). Raj 
(2011) adds:
the dimensions of conflict in eastern DR 
Congo range from internal to regional 
power struggles to tensions over identity, 
ethnicity, and resources…it is equally 
undeniable that the multimillion dollar 
global minerals trade is one of the central 
issues fueling the conflict and the cor-
responding humanitarian crisis. Though 
mineral wealth did not cause the original 
war in DR Congo, the mineral trade sus-
tains armed combatants and fuels ongo-




A growing international awareness of the conflict in 
the Congo in recent years has sparked outrage and a 
call for action. Many countries, such as the United 
States, have decided to organize legislation, frame-
works, and sanctions against the trade of conflict 
minerals, with an aim for peace, transparency, and 
accountability.
Perhaps one of the earliest anti-conflict mineral ini-
tiatives was birthed in 2003, with the creation of the 
Kimberley Process. The Kimberley Process Certifica-
tion Scheme was adopted by forty countries involved 
in the diamond industry, as well as the World Dia-
mond Council and two NGOs, Global Witness and 
Partnership Africa Canada (Lecomte, 2014). This 
public-private partnership aims to eradicate conflict 
minerals via export bans. Its framework outlines the 
Kimberley Process’s governing authoritative bodies, 
organization and decision-making structures, respon-
sibilities for monitoring performance, and guide-
lines for public disclosure (Lecomte, 2014). While 
the Kimberley Process remains in place today, it has 
achieved mixed results and received harsh criticism 
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because of its voluntary nature, self-policing, inad-
equate monitoring, administrative structure, consen-
sus system of decision-making, and lack of independ-
ent supervision (Nanda, 2014). And similar to other 
anti-conflict mineral legislation, the Kimberley Pro-
cess has had difficulty maintaining legitimacy due to 
corruption and smuggling (Rhode, 2014).
Since then, there have been other international 
movements to stop the conflict mineral trade. In 
2013, the European Trade Commissioner, Karel De 
Gucht, claimed that the European Union had devel-
oped a successful initiative on responsible mineral 
sourcing, and he pledged that the European Union 
would “help keep money out of the hands of rebel 
groups” (Nanda, 2014, p. 287), and “help ensure 
that revenues from natural resources instead go to 
the government, strengthening the rule of law and 
improving the provision of vital services like health 
and education” (Nanda, 2014, p. 287). Canada is 
also responding to the Congolese conflict. In 2013, 
they issued a “private member’s bill” (Nanda, 2014, 
p. 300) that addressed issues of mineral extraction, 
processing, purchase, trade, and use.
There have also been efforts within the DRC itself 
to remedy conflict mineral violence. For instance, 
the International Conference on the Great Lakes Re-
gion (ICGLR)—an intergovernmental organization 
including both the DRC and Rwanda—created a 
mineral certification process titled the ICGLR Re-
gional Initiative Against the Exploitation of Natural 
Resources (Nanda, 2014). Its Regional Certification 
Mechanism (RCM) has four components: mine in-
spection and traceability, the creation of a regional 
mineral tracking database, audits, and independent 
monitoring, although the implementation of the lat-
ter two requirements has not been finalized (Nanda, 
2014). Despite this legislation, however, govern-
ments in the Great Lakes Region of Africa have failed 
to uphold the mineral certification process (Nanda, 
2014).
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) has also been instrumental 
in creating an international framework for the regu-
lation and trade of conflict minerals. In 2011, the 
member nations of the OECD revised existing in-
ternational guidelines regarding corporate behavior 
to promote more stringent principles in defense of 
human rights. One of the new guidelines introduced 
during revisions was Due Diligence Guidance, which 
builds off of the general principle of due diligence 
and supply chain provisions already existing in the 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
(Nanda, 2014). The Due Diligence Guidance im-
plicated not only the OECD, but also the United 
Nations, the governments of the Great Lakes Region 
of Africa, the business community, and several civil 
society groups (Nanda, 2014). The OECD (2013) 
guidelines state that its mission is to:
help companies respect human rights and 
avoid contributing to conflict through 
sourcing decisions…[to] help companies 
contribute to sustainable development 
and source responsibly from conflict-af-
fected and high-risk areas, while creating 
the enabling conditions for constructive 
engagement with suppliers. (p. 12)
OECD guidelines of due diligence apply to every 
company that uses conflict minerals, regardless of 
their placement on the supply chain. However, the 
framework does specify that due diligence should be 
tailored to the individual company depending on 
matters such as the size of the enterprise, its loca-
tion, situation, and the nature of the products pro-
duced (Nanda, 2014). While the customization of 
due diligence requirements is important, it can also 
be problematic: on an economic note, it is more ex-
pensive to evaluate each company and personalize a 
due diligence plan for it. Customization could also 
be problematic, however, because it may create the 
opportunity for loopholes. Without some universal 
standard requirement concerning mineral sourcing, 
companies may begin slipping through the cracks.
There are four main sections of the OECD Due Dili-
gence Guidance: a detailing of the overarching due 
diligence structure, an example of a mineral supply 
chain policy, suggestions for risk mitigation and in-
dicators for measuring improvement, and two sup-
plements on conflict minerals, specifically designed 
to address the challenges associated with the supply 
chain structures of tin, tantalum, tungsten, and gold 
(OECD, 2013). In terms of the actual due diligence 
process itself, the OECD outlines a five step process. 
First, strong company management systems must be 
established. In order to do so, the OECD suggests 
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improved communication with suppliers as well as 
the public, increased transparency, and a company- 
or industry-wide grievance system (OECD, 2013). 
Second, risk in conflict mineral supply chains must 
be identified and assessed (OECD, 2013). Third, 
companies must design and implement a strategy to 
respond to the formerly identified risks. Such a strat-
egy should include reporting risk assessment findings, 
devising and implementing a risk management plan, 
and completing supplementary risk assessments for 
those requiring mitigation (OECD, 2013). Fourth, 
companies should complete third-party audits of 
supply chain due diligence at specified points along 
the supply chain (OECD, 2013). Finally, companies 
should submit a report on their supply chain due 
diligence policies (OECD, 2013).
Additionally, several international industries have 
also responded to the crisis in the Congo. For in-
stance, in 2012 the World Gold Council implement-
ed the Conflict-Free Gold Standard to assess gold 
extraction, with a focus on financial transparency, 
human rights protection, and creating a justice sys-
tem of reporting and revolving infringements (Nan-
da, 2014). Another industry group that has taken 
a stand against the conflict mineral trade is the Re-
sponsible Jewelry Council (RJC). The RJC places an 
emphasis on jewelers upholding “responsible stand-
ards” (Nanda, 2014, p. 301) for mining and buying 
gold and diamonds.
U.S. Response
The United States is arguably one of the world’s most 
influential countries in terms of advocating for peace 
in the DRC, in terms of both its aid programs and 
its legislation. U.S. annual bilateral aid to the Congo 
totaled between $200 million and $300 million in 
recent years, not including an additional $50 million 
to $150 million of annual emergency aid and anoth-
er $400 million to $600 million in annual contribu-
tions to the U.N. Organization Stabilization Opera-
tion in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Arieff, 
2014).
Apart from the Office of Detainee Affairs, the U.S. 
wields its influence via legislation and foreign pol-
icy, most notably Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank 
Act. Before delving into the Dodd-Frank Act, how-
ever, it is important to note some lesser examples of 
Congressional action regarding the Congo. The U.S. 
Congress has taken several routes to deter corruption 
and conflict in the DRC: restricting bilateral aid to 
the Congo when militaristic state-backed forces mis-
behave, such as by employing child soldiers or failing 
to appropriately respond to human trafficking; re-
stricting government-to-government assistance when 
the DRC fails to uphold budgetary transparency; au-
thorizing targeted sanctions against dangerous rebel 
persons; and restricting military aid to Rwanda if the 
government is caught supporting rebel groups (Ari-
eff, 2014). In past years, the U.S. has also been in-
volved in facilitating peace accords in the Great Lakes 
Region of Africa (Arieff, 2014).
These actions aside, the most important—and glob-
ally influential—piece of U.S. legislation regarding 
the Congo in recent years is Section 1502 of the 
Dodd-Frank Act. Not only has this act impacted life 
in the Congo significantly—the impacts of which 
will be examined in the next section—it has also 
served as legislative inspiration for other nations, 
such as the European Union, who have strived to 
imitate it (Nanda, 2014). The regulations set forth 
in the Dodd-Frank Act were issued by the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission and were made offi-
cial when the act was signed into federal law in July 
2010 (Nanda, 2014). In the most simplified sense, 
the Dodd-Frank Act simply requires that companies 
disclose whether or not the minerals used—or con-
tracted to be used—to create their goods and services 
have been implicated in conflict in the DRC (Nanda, 
2014). The Dodd-Frank Act (2010) begins by put-
ting Congressional concerns front and center:
It is the sense of Congress that the ex-
ploitation and trade of conflict minerals 
originating in the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo is helping to finance con-
flict characterized by extreme levels of vi-
olence in the eastern Democratic Repub-
lic of the Congo, particularly sexual- and 
gender-based violence, and contributing 
to an emergency humanitarian situation 
therein. (p. 838)
These concerns are the foundation of the Act’s due 
diligence framework. According to the Dodd-Frank 
Act, companies must determine if minerals originat-
ed in the DRC or an adjoining country, and if so, 
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they must then submit a report to the SEC (Dodd-
Frank Act, 2010). In turn, this report must contain 
several key pieces of information. First, there must be 
a description of the due diligence measures undertak-
en by the company that includes a certified private 
sector audit, which simply means that an impartial 
third party must come in to evaluate how well the 
company executed their mineral sourcing. The re-
port must also include a description of the products 
manufactured or expected to be manufactured with 
minerals that are not conflict free, including the min-
erals’ country of origin, the processing facilities used 
to mine them, and the efforts taken to source them 
(Dodd-Frank Act, 2010).
The second part of Section 1502 requires the Secre-
tary of State to devise a strategy “to address the link-
ages between human rights abuses, armed groups, 
mining of conflict minerals, and commercial prod-
ucts” (Dodd-Frank Act, 2010, p. 840). The plan must 
focus on supporting the Congolese government in its 
pursuit of peace and security, with special emphasis 
on monitoring and ceasing commercial activity that 
contributes to violence and human rights abuses, as 
well as a devotion to creating stronger institutions 
and governance to improve trade facilitation and 
transparency (Dodd-Frank Act, 2010). Additionally, 
the plan should guide companies seeking to exercise 
due diligence and describe punitive measures that 
will be inflicted upon groups failing to comply with 
the Act’s mission of peace and human rights (Dodd-
Frank Act, 2010).
Under Section 1502, the Secretary of State is also re-
sponsible for creating a map—the Conflict Minerals 
Map—that details “mineral-rich zones, trade routes, 
and areas under the control of armed groups in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo and adjoin-
ing countries based on data from multiple sources” 
(Dodd-Frank Act, 2010, p. 841). The map must be 
regularly updated, released to the public, and used by 
Congress (Dodd-Frank Act, 2010).
The next sub-section of the Dodd-Frank Act details 
a multitude of reports to be made by Comptroller 
General of the United States in order to determine 
both the effectiveness of Section 1502 and to main-
tain accountability of its due diligence process. The 
necessary reports include a baseline report that as-
sesses the rate of sexual- and gender-based violence 
in the Congo and adjoining nations, a “regular report 
on effectiveness” (Dodd-Frank Act, 2010, p. 841)—
which includes information such as any problems 
encountered when implementing the Act—and a re-
port on private sector auditing, which both assesses 
the current audits and makes recommendations for 
improvements in future audits (Dodd-Frank Act, 
2010).
The final section of the Dodd-Frank Act deals with 
technicalities and definitions. Perhaps the most im-
portant definition presented in this section is that of 
“conflict mineral,” which includes the expected gold, 
tin, tantalum, and tungsten, but also leaves some lee-
way to include other potentially problematic miner-
als:
The term “conflict mineral” means (a) 
columbite-tantalite (coltan), cassiterite, 
gold, wolframite, or their derivatives; or 
(b) any other mineral or its derivatives 
determined by the Secretary of State to 
be financing conflict in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo or an adjoining 




Anti-conflict mineral legislation was passed with the 
intention to terminate the trade of conflict minerals, 
stem the flow of income to armed actors in the Con-
go, and thus help end the violence and conflict in the 
DRC. While peace may have been the motivation 
behind much of this legislation, the question now 
stands: has peace been the outcome of such legisla-
tion? Using the Dodd-Frank Act as a case study, this 
section will seek to understand the real-life implica-
tions of anti-conflict mineral legislation in the DRC. 
In particular, this section will explore claims that the 
Dodd-Frank Act has hurt, not helped, the Congo.
First and foremost, it is important to note that the 
Dodd-Frank Act is a piece of legislation that operates 
in accordance with the notion that greed serves as a 
cause of civil war. This is a notion that was cham-
pioned by scholars Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, 
whose work will be discussed later on. In short, how-
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ever, the argument claims that rebellions and armed 
conflicts occur out of a desire on the part of combat-
ants to profit, and that combatants will seize any op-
portunities for self-enrichment (Collier & Hoeffler, 
2004). The Dodd-Frank Act tries to counteract the 
greed motivation by limiting profit opportunities for 
armed groups, namely by discouraging the purchase 
of conflict minerals through due diligence and min-
eral sourcing.
Legislators saw such due diligence reports as a step 
that could simply be inserted into the trade chains of 
tin, tantalum, tungsten and gold. What they did not 
foresee, however, was how implanting due diligence 
reports into the middle of trade chains would change 
other steps and processes along the chain. The U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission estimated that 
it could cost companies an annual $71 million to 
implement due diligence measures such as database 
tracking, on-site mine monitoring and multiple au-
dits; the National Association of Manufacturers put 
forth even greater expense estimates, ranging between 
$9 billion and $16 billion dollars per company per 
year (Drajem, Hamilton & Kavanagh, 2011). Instead 
of these expenditures simply being an added measure 
in the trade chain, they actually worked to alter trade 
altogether. These expenses incentivized many mul-
tinational companies to completely pull out of the 
DRC due to the belief that the costs of participating 
in Congolese trade outweighed any benefits (Drajem 
et al., 2004). For instance, even without the added 
expense of due diligence reports, the DRC does not 
offer a very hospitable business environment to for-
eign corporations: it suffers from lack of transpar-
ency, risks of violence and corruption, and the threat 
of companies being implicated in human rights vio-
lations and suffering consequently tarnished reputa-
tions. One example is the case of Malaysia Smelting, 
one of the largest global tin producers, which had 
previously purchased 80% of the DRC’s tin (Wolfe, 
2015). After the passing of anti-conflict mineral leg-
islation, Malaysia Smelting entirely stopped purchas-
ing Congolese ore out of the fear of “being labeled a 
user of conflict minerals” (Wolfe, 2015).
Yet even for companies that maintained business re-
lations in the Congo despite new compliance costs, 
due diligence reports were still not necessarily a 
booming success. Some companies simply did not 
make conflict-free mineral sourcing a serious pri-
ority—most notably, car and plane manufacturers 
“stood back and refused to use their buying power 
to bring change” (Propper & Knight, 2013). But 
even companies that were sincerely concerned with 
the crisis in the Congo had difficulty determining the 
legitimacy of their minerals, oftentimes through no 
fault of their own. There have been many criticisms 
regarding the difficulty of proving mineral legitimacy 
in the DRC: lack of regulation on federal and local 
levels, a cumbersome certification process, poor in-
frastructure, and turbulent conditions on-site (Prop-
per & Knight, 2013). For instance, according to 
Adalbert Murhi Mubalama—the minister of mines 
in the South Kivu province—companies cannot even 
audit mines in Shabunda territory, where most mines 
are located, because the land is controlled by a ruth-
less militia (Raghavan, 2014). So ruthless is this mili-
tia that, according to Mubalama, the Congolese gov-
ernment cannot even enter the territory (Raghavan, 
2014).
Besides a chaotic environment and inefficient bu-
reaucracy, there have also been issues on the scientific 
and technical levels with regards to the fingerprinting 
conflict minerals. Immediately after mining, mineral 
ores are processed to become ore concentrates—that 
is, small, granular bits of powder. During this process, 
ores from different mines are often mixed together, 
meaning that ores from conflict-free mines may very 
well be mixed with ores from conflict mines (Arnaud, 
2012). The mixed ores are then smelted together—a 
process that extracts metal from the ores via heating 
and melting—and “after the metal has been extract-
ed from the ore, there may be no way to determine 
provenance” (Arnaud, 2012, p. 37). This means that 
if multinational companies trace their minerals back 
to smelters—such as in the cases of Apple and In-
tel—they have no real way to prove that their miner-
als are conflict-free, because all the ores have been 
melted together (An Open Letter, 2014). This means 
that companies may very well have purchased a met-
al mixture containing both conflict and conflict-free 
minerals. There are movements in the science com-
munity to develop technology to geochemically fin-
gerprint minerals, which would mean being able to 
determine mineral origins even after smelting, such 
as laser-induced breakdown spectroscopy (Arnaud, 
2012). However, even this burgeoning technology 
is viewed skeptically by many scholars, who remain 
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unconvinced that such techniques will be affordable, 
realistic, or even capable of providing suitable min-
eral fingerprints for due diligence purposes (Arnaud, 
2012).
There are further issues with fingerprinting conflict 
minerals. There is a serious lack of transparency in the 
overall trade of minerals, which makes it exceedingly 
difficult if not impossible to track minerals to their 
true origin. For example, many of the Congo’s miner-
als are sent across national borders to Rwanda, where 
they are then processed and sold to multinational 
companies (De Koning, 2011). However, Rwanda 
registers any minerals processed in the country under 
their own country of origin (De Koning, 2011). As a 
result, companies may be buying processed minerals 
from Rwanda believing they were sourced there in 
conflict-free conditions, when in reality the miner-
als were mined under conditions of violence in the 
Congo and simply washed clean by some manipula-
tive paperwork that alters their country of origin.
Because of all these difficulties surrounding mineral 
legitimacy, with the passing of the Dodd-Frank Act 
in 2010, many corporations pulled out of business 
investments in the Congo (Drajem et al., 2011).  At 
the very least, most traders delayed mineral purchases 
until they could vouch for their origins (Drajem et 
al., 2011). What resulted was a de facto embargo on 
mining in the DRC (Gallo, 2011). At the same time, 
in September 2010, the Congolese government issued 
“a six-month ban on all mining and trading activities 
in the East” (Gettleman, 2013). Only two months 
after the Dodd-Frank Act had been signed into law, 
mineral production had ceased even at mining facili-
ties not operated by armed groups (Raghavan, 2014). 
The combination of the de facto embargo and the 
de jure mining ban had resulted in the Congolese 
mining and trade sector shuddering to a halt and the 
obliteration of local economies (Drajem et al., 2011).
The official ban was lifted six months later in March 
2011, but by then the damage was already done and 
its aftershocks were clearly visible in the DRC eco-
nomically and socially. Official mining businesses 
did not recuperate well. Many artisanal mines simply 
never re-opened and legal mineral exports did not 
bounce back to the same levels as before the ban. For 
instance, by April 2011, legal tantalum exports from 
the DRC had dropped by more than 90%, bring-
ing legitimate tantalum production to a near stand-
still (Drajem et al., 2011). Another example can be 
seen in the region of Luntukulu, which used to be a 
hotspot for international mineral trade, with scores 
of businessmen flocking there each year to purchase 
minerals for smelting. In 2014, however, only 12 
buyers made an appearance, according to commu-
nity leaders (Raghavan, 2014). Many of these buyers 
were from India and China, where the Dodd-Frank 
Act has no jurisdiction (Raghavan, 2014). The sud-
den loss of Western clients reverberated throughout 
the Luntukulu community: shops closed, families 
went hungry, and miners bitterly blamed what they 
call “Loi Obama”—Obama’s Law (Raghavan, 2014).
The boycott of Congolese minerals did not just 
have a microeconomic impact on regions such as 
Luntukulu, however; it also made an impression in 
a macroeconomic sense, negatively affecting Con-
golese exports in the global arena. When foreign 
companies began to avoid buying minerals from the 
DRC, the international prices of Congolese minerals 
were driven down. For example, before the passing of 
the Dodd-Frank Act, Congolese miners could receive 
$7 per kg of tin (Raghavan, 2014). This number was 
still dramatically underpriced compared to the rest 
of the world market for tin, in which most countries 
could receive $18 per kg (Raghavan, 2014). After the 
Dodd-Frank Act came into play, this price gap only 
grew. In 2014, Congolese miners could expect to re-
ceive the equivalent of $4 per kg of tin, even though 
the world market price for tin was now worth $22 
per kg (Raghavan, 2014).
The good news is that while the DRC’s economy suf-
fered, the income and authority of armed groups in 
the Congo suffered too. Some reports estimate that 
nearly 10% of mines in Eastern Congo have been 
declared “clean,” meaning that they are now demili-
tarized (Gettleman, 2013). However, these same re-
ports are careful to note that even though these mines 
may be officially demilitarized, it does not necessarily 
mean they are free of conflict, as many of these clean 
mines still reside in territories controlled by armed 
groups or rebels (Gettleman, 2013).
Another study put forth by the Enough Project of-
fers even more optimistic findings, claiming that 
the Dodd-Frank Act actually achieved its goal of de-
creasing the presence of armed groups in the Congo’s 
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mines. According to this study, which was produced 
from five months of field research, armed groups 
have lost control of nearly two-thirds of the mining 
sites they previously presided over (Wolfe, 2015). 
However, some critics have argued that “the asser-
tion that any decrease was due to Dodd-Frank…is 
impossible to prove” (Wolfe, 2015), and suggest that 
the Enough Project’s study may make the error of 
mistaking correlation for causation, although they 
do not provide any insight into what other causes 
may be. Other research similarly confirms a de-mil-
itarization of mines, although progress admittedly 
seems to be slow and unstable. As of June 2014, it 
was reported that twenty five mining sites in South 
and North Kivu were declared “green”—meaning no 
armed groups, children, or pregnant laborers were 
employed—but this is still a minor fraction out of 
hundreds of mines in the region (Raghavan, 2014). 
And as of October 2014, 11 mines in South Kivu had 
been declared completely conflict free (Raghavan, 
2014). This is an honorable feat, though with an ap-
proximated 900 mines present in South Kivu, there 
is clearly still a great deal of work to be done (Ra-
ghavan, 2014).
Still, it is significant to note that armed groups saw 
their profits from conflict minerals drop after the 
passing of the Dodd-Frank Act. One report claims 
that “armed groups that were trading in tin, tanta-
lum, and tungsten saw their profits drop by sixty five 
percent” (Gettleman, 2013). However, it is equally 
important to note that these profit decreases were not 
massive enough to significantly deter conflict in the 
Congo. This is for a variety of reasons. The first rea-
son is that armed groups were never solely dependent 
on mineral revenue for their existence; therefore, they 
are able to continue existing even without monetary 
aid from minerals (Wolfe, 2015). Many militias sim-
ply turned to other trades to make up the difference 
in lack of income, trades of such items as charcoal, 
marijuana, palm oil, soap, and various consumer 
goods (An Open Letter, 2014). Many non-state mili-
tias also simply resorted to kidnapping and extortion 
as major sources of income (Gallo, 2011).
Furthermore, many illegal exports were able to con-
tinue even after the mining ban, thanks to a thriv-
ing black market, as well as a stockpile of mineral 
resources in the possession of armed groups (De 
Koning, 2011). Although it is difficult to track the 
financial specifics of the black market, there are many 
ways to surmise evidence of illegal activity across Af-
rican borders. Take for instance recent export statis-
tics from Uganda and Burundi. In the last decade, as 
the DRC’s exports decreased, Uganda and Burundi’s 
exports have dramatically increased. In their peak 
year of 2006, Burundi and Uganda exported over 4.5 
t and 7 t of gold respectively, even though both coun-
tries had “negligible domestic production capacities” 
(De Koning, 2011, p. 11). Based on the difference 
between the countries’ domestic production capaci-
ties and their actual export quotas, it is estimated that 
“over ten tonnes of gold must have arrived in Burundi 
and Uganda from elsewhere in 2006. The DRC is the 
most likely source” (De Koning, 2011, p. 11). Thus, 
while it is commendable that the profits of armed 
groups have decreased, this loss of income has not led 
to a disbandment of armed groups and decrease of 
conflict, as legislators hoped. Furthermore, what lit-
tle strides have been made in decreasing the profits of 
armed groups seem to be offset by the massive costs 
of the Dodd-Frank Act, namely the economic and 
humanitarian damage incurred by the Congo.
Such humanitarian damage is also an important con-
sequence to take into account when considering the 
relative failure of the Dodd-Frank Act. Negative rip-
ple effects from the Dodd-Frank Act can clearly be 
seen in the global and Congolese economies, but its 
effects are not limited strictly to fiscal matters—its 
damage has also extended to Congolese society to 
create a humanitarian crisis. When the mining and 
trade sector collapsed, so did the livelihoods of the 
Congolese. It is estimated that between 5 million to 
12 million Congolese were either directly or indi-
rectly impacted by the unemployment created by the 
mining ban and the aftershocks it produced (Wolfe, 
2015). The sudden lack of income meant deficiency 
in medical care, children dropping out of school, 
and widespread starvation and malnutrition (Gallo, 
2011).
But perhaps the most disconcerting social impact 
of the Dodd-Frank Act was the way it almost served 
to help, not hurt, armed groups in the DRC. Wide-
spread unemployment stemmed from the complicat-
ed reality that resources that may have funded armed 
conflict simultaneously “provide[d] livelihoods to 
many people who work in and around artisanal 
mines” (De Koning, 2011, p. 3). Thus, by cutting 
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off income for armed groups, more often than not 
income is also prevented from reaching legitimate, 
peaceful, independent miners. Many miners are be-
ing forced to find other ways to survive and have re-
sorted to joining armed groups or smuggling rackets 
for quick income and a greater sense of protection 
(An Open Letter, 2014). This is, in the most literal 
sense, a complete backfire of the Dodd-Frank Act’s 
intentions—a piece of legislation that was meant to 
disband Congolese armed groups is, in some instanc-
es, actually reinforcing their numbers. Furthermore, 
it is not only the former miners that join, but also 
sometimes children, and this creates an even greater 
problem: the children in question fail to receive an 
education and ultimately reinforce a historic cycle 
of knowledge poverty and militarized violence (Ra-
ghavan, 2014).
relevant literature
In light of the failure of the Dodd-Frank Act, the 
work of three scholars—Paul Collier, Anke Hoef-
fler, and William Reno—emerges as especially rel-
evant and insightful in understanding the crisis in 
the DRC. First is Collier’s work, which discusses 
the political and economic consequences of natural 
resources. Collier (2010) presents what he calls the 
“resource curse” (pp. 1106-1107), a term that he uses 
to describe nations possessing vast quantities of valu-
able natural resources, such as the Congo. According 
to Collier (2010), the resource curse can undermine 
both security and accountability within a nation. 
Furthermore, the more valuable the resources are, the 
less likely it is that a civil war occurring in that na-
tion will be settled, as there is greater opportunity for 
profit-seeking and greed (Collier, 2010).
According to Collier (2010), there are three ways 
that the resource curse contributes to civil wars. First, 
profits from commodity exports “provide opportu-
nities for rebel predation during conflict and so can 
finance the escalation and sustainability of rebellion” 
(p. 1111). Second, not only will such profit-earning 
opportunities simply be made feasible, but rebels may 
actually be motivated to seize income (Collier, 2010). 
Finally, governments of countries with vast resource 
wealth tend to be less accountable to their citizens, 
and thus less capable of preventing conflict (Collier, 
2010). All three consequences of the resource curse 
can clearly be seen in the current state of the Congo.
Important work is also put forth by Reno, particu-
larly a study which looks at the behavior of armed 
groups and patronage politics. Reno (2007) describes 
armed groups as “agents of disorder” (p. 324) that 
are often vulnerable to collaboration with “preda-
tory politicians, international criminals and local 
gangsters who occupy positions of power in failing 
states” (p. 324). He explains that armed groups can 
play one of two roles in a civil war: predator or pro-
tectorate (Collier, 2010). Reno may make this binary 
a bit too clearly defined, however. As is evident in 
the Congo, sometimes the roles of armed groups are 
not so black-and-white. The FARDC, for instance, 
is supposed to protect Congolese citizens, but often 
ends up exploiting them as much as any rebel army.
Nevertheless, Reno (2007) points out that predatory 
armed groups make wars longer and more violent as 
they vie for control of local communities and exploit 
natural resources. People who join these groups of-
ten do so to “increase their status and gain a measure 
of greater personal security” (Reno, 2007, p. 324), 
a motive that was clearly at play when unemployed 
artisanal miners in the Congo decided to begin join-
ing armed groups after the mining ban and embargo. 
Reno (2007) also makes note of the fact that “the 
most predatory and socially destabilizing violence 
should develop in areas where the political estab-
lishment was most closely linked to the patronage 
networks of the capital” (p. 337), pointing towards 
a type of corruption that has corroded modern Con-
golese politics.
Finally, work by Collier and Hoeffler presents the 
debate over the motivation of civil wars: greed or 
grievance? While it could be argued that both play 
significant roles in breeding dissent, Collier and Ho-
effler make a strong case for greed over grievance. 
They cite three opportunities for conflict that are cre-
ated by greed. First is the availability of finance: the 
idea that “primary commodity exports substantially 
increase conflict risk” (Collier & Hoeffler, 2010, p. 
588), because the greater quantity and quality of 
exports a nation has, the more potential for profit 
it offers to armed groups, and thus the incentive to 
defect is greater. Second is the cost of rebellion; in na-
tions where the costs of rebellion are higher, such as 
greater rates of secondary male education, per capita 
income, and growth, the less likely civil war becomes 
(Collier & Hoeffler, 2010). In nations like the DRC, 
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however, where there is lower quality of life, combat-
ants have less to lose and more to gain by rebellion. 
Finally, there is military advantage: the idea that in 
countries with dispersed populations, militaries will 
better be able to seize control of local communities, 
and thus conflict will increase (Collier & Hoeffler, 
2010). This, too, is evident in the Congo—a vast ter-
ritory with a weak centralized government is the per-
fect recipe for rebellious armed groups to seize and 
conquer.
In reviewing the works of these three authors, the 
complexities at play in the Congo become a bit more 
clearly defined in the light of modern political the-
ories. In fact, in many ways the Congo stands as a 
perfect case study in support of these claims—their 
resources have bred conflict, armed groups have in-
creased citizen insecurity, and greed has contributed 
to civil war. However, the failure of the Dodd-Frank 
Act may also suggest that in some ways, the Congo 
isn’t actually a perfect fit with these theories. After 
all, the Dodd-Frank Act targeted two main sources of 
civil war as according to these scholars: the resource 
curse and greed. Despite this, the Dodd-Frank Act 
failed to end conflict in the Congo. Perhaps this 
failure suggests that greed is not the greatest driving 
factor behind civil war. Maybe in the Congo or else-
where, grievances—such as issues of citizenship, poli-
tics, and ethnicity—can sometimes trump greed, or 
at least play equally significant roles in driving con-
flict, and should be similarly addressed in legislation.
solutions for Peace
Anti-conflict mineral legislation, the Dodd-Frank 
Act in particular, was passed with intentions to cre-
ate stability and peace in the DRC. Yet much of this 
same legislation did little to encourage either and, 
in some instances, actually actively worked against a 
mission of peace.
So where does this paradox leave us? Global leaders 
tried to cure the problem but instead aggravated it. 
So is there any real solution to the crisis in the Con-
go? While there may not be one miraculous panacea, 
there are some improvements that could be made 
in the way in which foreign policy understands and 
handles the Congolese crisis, which may ultimately 
lead to more successful means of achieving peace.
First and foremost, there needs to be reform in the 
way global leaders understand the crisis in the DRC. 
As is, legislators seem to have a very limited, shal-
low—and therefore, seriously flawed—understand-
ing of what exactly is happening in the Congo. An 
Open Letter, published in 2014 and signed by seventy 
scholars, politicians, and civil society authorities, 
claimed that “the conflict minerals campaign funda-
mentally misunderstands the relationship between 
minerals and conflict in the eastern DRC” (p. 1). 
Legislators have been criticized for having a griev-
ously one-dimensional understanding of the conflict 
for thinking of conflict minerals as being directly and 
solely responsible for humanitarian abuses. They over-
simplify the conflict by believing that “iPhones cause 
rape” and “shiny things fuel war” (Wolfe, 2015). This 
sort of belief is problematic because it presents an un-
derstanding of the relationship between Congolese 
minerals and Congolese conflict that is too narrow, 
and this incomplete understanding in turn leads to 
limited or ineffective conflict resolutions.
This is not to say that conflict minerals and the con-
sumer goods that utilize them do not play a role in 
the conflict. They undeniably do. However, to reduce 
conflict in the Congo merely to tin, tantalum, tung-
sten, and gold is to disregard the multitude of nuanc-
es and complexities that comprise the crisis. Passing 
legislation that solely addresses conflict minerals is an 
action that only treats a symptom of the problem. 
Even if the trade of conflict minerals was stopped, 
it is highly unlikely that all violence in the Congo 
would accordingly cease (Wolfe, 2015). The bottom 
line is that even if armed groups aren’t fighting over 
minerals, there will always be something else to fight 
over. This is because conflict minerals were never the 
only source of conflict. The issues at play are politi-
cal, ethnic, national, historical, and regional; they 
are issues of citizenship, of identity, of access to land 
(Raghavan, 2014). These are the significant drivers of 
conflict. These are the sorts of issues that should be 
considered and targeted in sanctions and legislation. 
The global understanding of the crisis in the Congo 
needs to be deepened and complicated because the 
problem is much greater and encompassing than the 
trade of conflict minerals, and understanding its in-
tricacies is a vital component in being able to craft 
effective peace solutions. After all, how can legisla-
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tors create a solution for a problem they do not fully 
understand?
Another aspect of foreign policy relating to the DRC 
that should be reconsidered is the practicality of any 
measures passed—that is, whether or not the laws can 
actually be carried out and enforced—particularly in 
regards to the conflict mineral trade (An Open Letter, 
2014). Laws need to be realistic and feasible. Due dil-
igence laws, while good enough in theory, are neither 
of these in practice. Such laws placed the brunt of 
the mineral certification process on the DRC itself, 
when the reality of the situation is that the DRC sim-
ply was not capable of bearing these responsibilities 
(Anderson, 2014). Advocates of laws like the Dodd-
Frank Act expected the Congolese government to 
provide an environment for businesses in which they 
could produce due diligence reports and legitimately 
purchase minerals, but the mechanisms to do so did 
not and do not exist in the Congo, where there is still 
too much instability and corruption. Reports have 
claimed that as of 2010, there were not any traceabil-
ity or certification systems in the DRC that met the 
full requirements of due diligence laws (Anderson, 
2014).
The question that follows is somewhat obvious. 
What is the point of passing legislation if it exists 
in an environment that is unable to enforce it? Was 
Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act instated merely 
for appearances, so companies could pat themselves 
on the back for their good-doing while washing their 
hands free of the conflict? Due diligence laws may 
be effective if there were a means of implementation. 
But implementing such certification procedures and 
institutions would be a struggle for any country, let 
alone one with such vast territory and such a decen-
tralized, weak federal government as the DRC (An-
derson, 2014). Therefore, when legislators are creat-
ing processes for peace, they need to work with what 
they’ve got. Solutions can only be effective if they can 
be carried out. Legislators need to search for helpful 
actions that are possible given the current means of 
the Congo and reality of its economic, political, and 
social situations.
This idea goes hand-in-hand with the suggestion that 
legislators need to make an effort toward improved 
consultation with the Congolese government and 
improved communication with Congolese commu-
nities. Neither group was taken much into account in 
the passing of the Dodd-Frank Act and due diligence 
laws: “few local stakeholders have been included in 
on-going international policy-making, and as a result 
realities on the ground have not always been taken 
into account” (An Open Letter, 2014, p. 1). Congo-
lese insight about local context and power structures, 
however, could have been an invaluable resource in 
terms of crafting feasible, appropriate peace solutions 
(An Open Letter, 2014).
Furthermore, communication with the Congolese 
would have better helped legislators predict how well 
the Dodd-Frank Act would or would not have been 
received and implemented, as well as what the act’s 
fall-out would be. For instance, had legislators better 
understood the needs of local civilians, they might 
have realized that most miners had little incentive to 
help carry out mineral certification schemes, even if 
the measures to do so were in place. Christoph Vogel, 
co-author of the aforementioned open letter about 
anti-conflict mineral legislation, explains that, “a 
Congolese miner has a lot of difficulty understand-
ing the usefulness of these kinds of systems because 
for him or her the main thing is to earn a few bucks a 
day just to nourish their families” (Anderson, 2014). 
Had legislators grasped this mentality, they might 
have been better able to craft incentives for Con-
golese to cooperate with due diligence laws. Vogel, 
for instance, suggests incentives via improved busi-
ness practices: “the more you can help them improve 
labor security in the mines and create better infra-
structure, the more you will motivate them to be-
come interested in these clean mineral frameworks” 
(Anderson, 2014).
This relates to other suggestions to use better busi-
ness practices as incentives for legal mining activity. 
One suggestion, put forth in the open letter, is the 
imposition of a minimum wage to help curb corrup-
tion. Many Congolese default to black markets, tax 
fraud, and other illegal activities out of the need to 
provide and survive, since most are underpaid (An 
Open Letter, 2014). However, even this suggestion is 
not without its faults: if the Congolese government 
could not help enforce due diligence laws, will they 
really be able to enforce a minimum wage? The open 
letter also suggests the promotion of fair competition 
by giving miners increased leverage on price in the 
global arena and not underselling minerals, which 
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may help standardize, equalize, and legalize the min-
eral trade (An Open Letter, 2014).
Another change that should be made at the legisla-
tive level is the push toward meaningful reform. This 
means that legislators need to critically and con-
sciously be aware of who they are creating laws for 
and what their motives are. Take the Dodd-Frank 
Act, for example. It is, essentially, a piece of legis-
lation that was created via Western framework and 
was then slapped on a very non-Western country that 
was frankly incompatible with the ideas and actions 
proposed in the Act. Considering this, one may ask: 
who was the Dodd-Frank Act for? Was it truly for the 
Congolese, as it claimed, or was it for the American 
people themselves? Consider this: the Dodd-Frank 
Act helped produce ethical goods for American con-
sumers so that they could have clear consciences and 
peace of mind without having to sacrifice their iP-
hones, computers, televisions, and cars. At the same 
time, the Dodd-Frank Act did very little to improve 
the daily lives of the Congolese people, and in some 
instances, further damaged life in the Congo. Ul-
timately, it was a piece of legislation that benefited 
the consumers more than it benefited the producers 
(Gallo, 2011).
So, who was the Dodd-Frank Act for? Considering 
the above fall-out of the law, it seems as though it 
was very much oriented toward the satisfaction of the 
Americans and not the Congolese. It may even hint 
towards a bit of “white man’s burden,” echoing the 
Congo’s past of manipulative imperialism—such as 
when Leopold plundered the DRC’s resources, inter-
vened in Congolese affairs, and ultimately hurt the 
country under the guise of helping the Africans.  If 
legislators want to truly help in the Congo, then they 
need to set goals for meaningful reform for the day-
to-day lives of the Congolese, not the appeasement of 
Western consumers. They need to make sure that the 
measures they are implementing are measures that 
are actually going to help the people that need help.
conclusion
The Dodd-Frank Act and other anti-conflict mineral 
legislation were created with good intentions. Nev-
ertheless, most legislation still failed to bring about 
conflict resolution in the DRC, and some even en-
couraged greater economic failure and thus increased 
conflict. The problem, then, is not necessarily with 
getting global legislators on board with the idea of 
helping the Congo find peace. Rather, the issue at 
hand is getting legislators to find the right ways to go 
about conflict resolution via trade and foreign policy.
Due diligence laws failed the DRC for a variety of 
reasons. They encouraged multinational businesses 
to pull out of Congolese investment, they were inef-
ficient and ineffective as a result of turbulence in the 
DRC, and perhaps most importantly, they failed to 
address the roots of conflict in the Congo. If legisla-
tors want to truly help solve the crisis in the DRC, 
they need to achieve an understanding of why these 
measures failed and learn from their mistakes. They 
need to pass legislation with a full understanding of 
the complex causes of conflict, they need to custom-
ize conflict resolution measures so that they are com-
patible with the reality of the Congo’s capabilities, 
and they need to use critical foresight to ensure that 
they are truly helping, not hurting, the people most 
in need of aid.
That being said, it is not solely the responsibility of 
international consumers and legislators to help the 
Congo find peace. Foreign policy and global sanc-
tions can only do so much. If the DRC wants to have 
any true chance of attaining peace and stability, it 
needs to learn to help itself. Governmental reform is 
essential. The DRC needs a strong, centralized feder-
al government that will be able to assert its authority 
over the various armed groups and feuding ethnici-
ties in order to bring peace and unity to the region. 
Additionally, the government needs to crack down 
on corruption and increase transparency, or else the 
historical pattern of chaos and turmoil in Congolese 
politics will continue.
It is easy to call for the DRC to seek change, but 
whether or not the nation will actually be able to self-
reform is another matter. If history does indeed repeat 
itself, then it seems that the Congo has a long road 
ahead of political, ethnic, and social disputes, of vio-
lence and corruption, and of international relations 
that usually do more harm than good. And there are 
plenty of people that do in fact think the Congo has 
passed the tipping point of salvation. One National 
Geographic article quoted a UN specialist who had 
been working on-site in the Congo for years: “There’s 
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no easy solution. I’m not even sure there is any solu-
tion” (Gettleman, 2013).
While it may be a bit too pessimistic and irrevocable 
to claim that there is no solution for the Congo, this 
UN specialist is right: there’s no easy fix, there’s no 
panacea for problems in the DRC. This is because 
there’s nothing easy about the problems themselves. 
Conflict in the Congo stems from a complicated 
snarl of political tensions, corrupt transactions, se-
vere poverty, ethnic divisions, problematic historical 
precedents, a culture of violence, and so much more. 
With so many issues to address, the Congo is going 
to need more than one solution. In fact, the DRC is 
going to need a groundswell of solutions—enough to 
assert a formidable presence in the Congo that sets a 
precedent for peace—because a few resolutions here 
and there are not going to amount to change on a na-
tional level, and “none of them has a realistic chance 
of success in isolation” (De Koning, 2011, p. 1).
With the massive nature of conflict in the Congo, 
it is going to take an accumulation of all of these 
things—foreign policy, Congolese self-reform, cus-
tomized solutions in bulk—in order to see true 
change. Although the Dodd-Frank Act and anti-con-
flict mineral legislation did not bring about desired 
change, this does not mean the global community 
should give up on the Congo. After all, it was the 
international demand for resources in the DRC that 
created a pattern of extraction, violence, conflict, and 
instability, and it was the complex interconnections 
of globalization that helped create the conflict miner-
al trade and sustain the violence (De Koning, 2011). 
Global consumers are therefore implicated in conflict 
in the Congo, and as such it could be argued that 
it is a matter of global responsibility—perhaps even 
one of responsibility to protect—that makes the in-
ternational community accountable for helping the 
Congo find peace.
While anti-conflict mineral legislation may not have 
resulted in its intended outcomes, the intentions be-
hind the legislation were a good start. Conflict min-
erals may not be the root cause of problems in the 
Congo, but they are still a problem, and the global 
community was not wrong in trying to stop their 
trade. Hopefully, the failure of anti-conflict mineral 
legislation will not discourage foreign actors from 
pursuing peace efforts in the DRC. The shortcom-
ings and negative fall-out of the Dodd-Frank Act and 
other anti-conflict mineral legislation should not be 
in vain. Instead, legislators should try to learn from 
their faults in order to produce stronger, more effec-
tive conflict resolutions, and should use the lessons 
learned from this failure as motivation to keep chas-
ing peace in the DRC despite all the many obstacles 
that will come their way.
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